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We present a general framework encompassing a number of continuous-variable quantum key
distribution protocols, including standard one-way protocols, measurement-device-independent pro-
tocols as well as some two-way protocols, or any other continuous-variable protocol involving only a
Gaussian modulation of coherent states and heterodyne detection. The main interest of this frame-
work is that the corresponding protocols are all covariant with respect to the action of the unitary
group U(n), implying that their security can be established thanks to a Gaussian de Finetti reduc-
tion. In particular, we give a composable security proof of two-way continuous-variable quantum
key distribution against general attacks. We also prove that no active symmetrization procedure is
required for these protocols, which would otherwise make them prohibitively costly to implement.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant
parties, Alice and Bob with access to an untrusted quan-
tum channel and an authenticated classical channel, to
share a secret key which can later be used to encrypt
classical messages. The remarkable property of QKD is
that its security can be established in the information-
theoretic setting, without appealing to any computa-
tional assumptions. While the first protocols relied on
a discrete encoding of information and required single-
photon detectors [1, 2], a new generation of protocols
called “continuous-variable” (CV) encode the informa-
tion on the quadratures of the quantized electromagnetic
field, allowing coherent detection to advantageously re-
place single-photon detection [3]. There is, however,
a price to pay for this simplified experimental setup
and this is increased difficulty of establishing security
proofs due to the fact that the finite-dimensional Hilbert
space of discrete-variable QKD has to be replaced by an
infinite-dimensional Fock space. Notably, the theoretical
tools developed for analyzing discrete-variable protocols
– de Finetti theorems [4–6], entropic uncertainty relations
[7], entropy accumulation [8] – need not directly work in
the CV setting.
Fortunately, some of these proof techniques have been
successfully adapted to continuous variables and two one-
way CVQKD protocols are now established to be secure
against general attacks. These are the no-switching pro-
tocol [9] where Alice sends coherent states with a Gaus-
sian modulation and Bob performs heterodyne (or dual-
homodyne) detection, and the BB84-inspired protocol of
Ref. [10] where Alice sends squeezed states along one of
the two quadratures and Bob performs homodyne detec-
tion. The security of the latter follows from a continuous-
variable version of the entropic uncertainty principle [11]
while that of the former protocol is established thanks
to a recently developed Gaussian de Finetti theorem
[12, 13], [43].
Establishing the security of two-way CVQKD, where
Alice and Bob send quantum information back and forth
through the channel, has been an outstanding goal in the
field and partial progress was obtained in Refs [14–21].
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these
works has proven its security against general attacks in
the composable setting. A notable recent result shows
that for all two-way CVQKD protocols, it is sufficient to
consider collective attacks [21]. Unfortunately, we don’t
know how to analyze this restricted class of attacks in the
composable setting, the main issue being the difficulty of
estimating the covariance matrix of the state shared by
Alice and Bob without assuming that this state is Gaus-
sian or admits bounded higher moments for instance.
In the present paper, we explore the possibility of ap-
plying the Gaussian de Finetti reduction to CVQKD be-
yond one-way schemes, for instance to the measurement-
device-independent (MDI) CVQKD protocol of Ref. [22,
23], the two-way protocol with Gaussian displacements
of Ref. [14] as well as a variant of floodlight (FL) QKD
[24–26]. What makes these protocols particularly note-
worthy is that they display a symmetry with respect to
the unitary group U(n), where n is the number of rounds
of the protocols. This is a significant strengthening of the
usual invariance under Alice and Bob randomly permut-
ing their n subsystems in a coordinated fashion. Recall
that the standard argument for establishing the security
of a protocol is to first remark that it is sufficient to
consider attacks displaying the same symmetry as the
protocol, and then that the usual de Finetti theorem pre-
cisely asserts that permutation-invariant states are close
to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) states,
which correspond to collective attacks [27]. For CVQKD,
however, collective attacks remain nontrivial to analyze
due to the infinite dimensionality of the Hilbert space.
In that case, the stronger U(n)-symmetry allows us to
exploit the Gaussian de Finetti theorem stating that it is
in fact sufficient to consider a class of Gaussian collective
attacks, which turn out to be fairly simple to handle.
A potential issue raised by exploiting the invariance
under U(n) is whether an active symmetrization must
be enforced by Alice and Bob, which would in particular
require picking a Haar random matrix in U(n) and make
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2the whole protocol unpractical. Here, following the idea
of Portmann [28] of dividing the QKD protocol into two
parts (first identifying a min-entropy resource, and then
extracting the key), we are able to show that no active
symmetrization is needed for our security proof to go
through, a result similar to what was known for discrete-
variable protocols [5].
In the following, we first describe our general frame-
work and show how it encompasses one-way as well as
two-way protocols. Then we explain in which sense they
are covariant with respect to the action of the unitary
group U(n), and how to exploit the Gaussian de Finetti
reduction to show that it is sufficient to analyze Gaussian
collective attacks. Finally, we discuss in more detail the
case of Gaussian two-way protocols.
A general framework for Gaussian protocols
with heterodyne detection.— One-way CVQKD al-
ready gives rise to a zoo of different protocols depend-
ing on the states sent by Alice (coherent, squeezed or
thermal), their modulation (Gaussian, discrete, along one
or two quadratures) and Bob’s detection (homodyne or
heterodyne): see Ref. [3] for a recent overview of CV
protocols. Two-way QKD offers even more possibilities!
Here we will restrict our attention to the “entanglement-
based” (EB) protocols where the honest parties prepare
bipartite pure states such as two-mode squeezed vacuum
states (TMSS) and exchange optical modes through an
untrusted quantum channel. This is without loss of gen-
erality since any Prepare-and-Measure (PM) protocol ad-
mits an EB version with the same security [29], and it
is therefore sufficient to analyze the latter version even if
one implements the PM scheme.
Gaussian protocols stand out among all CV protocols
as the ones where Alice and Bob start out by preparing
TMSS and only perform Gaussian operations and mea-
surements (homodyne or heterodyne): indeed Gaussian
attacks are then asymptotically optimal provided that
the covariance matrix of the state shared by the hon-
est parties is known, meaning that the security proof
is not composable [30–32]. In this paper, we consider
all protocols where Alice and Bob prepare TMSS, possi-
bly perform two-mode squeezing or beamsplitter trans-
formations (as described later) and finally measure their
respective modes with heterodyne detection.
The main feature of these protocols is that they are
covariant with respect to the action of the unitary group
U(n). Let us explain what this means. Given an
n-mode Fock space with annihilation operators a =
(a1, . . . , an), the unitary group acts on this space by
mapping a to Ua, and similarly a† to Ua†, where a†i
is the creation operator of mode i, and U is the com-
plex conjugate of U . A beamsplitter of transmittance
t ∈ [0, 1] and a two-mode squeezing operator with gain
g ≥ 1 act on a 2-mode Hilbert space with annihila-
tion operators a and b via the respective transformations
[a, a†, b, b†]T → B(t)[a, a†, b, b†]T and [a, a†, b, b†]T →
S(g)[a, a†, b, b†]T with B(t) =
[ √
t12 −
√
1−t12√
1−t12
√
t12
]
, S(g) =
[ √
g12
√
g−1σx√
g−1σx √g12
]
and σx = [ 0 11 0 ] [33]. Finally, hetero-
dyne detection is nothing else than a generalized mea-
surement where the POVM elements are given by coher-
ent states, as follows from the resolution of the iden-
tity of an n-mode Fock space: 1H = 1pin
∫ |α〉〈α|dα,
with dα the uniform measure on Cn. This can be
formalized as a quantum-classical map M defined by
M(ρ) = 1pin
∫ 〈α|ρ|α〉|αcl〉〈αcl|dα where the superscript
’cl’ means that this is a classical state encoding the value
of α and not a coherent state. An important property of
beamsplitters, two-mode squeezing and heterodyne de-
tection is that they all commute with the action of the
unitary group in the following sense: [S⊗n,U ⊗ U ] =
[B⊗n,U ⊗U ] = [M,U ] = 0, where S,B and U refer to the
action of the symplectic operations S,B and U on their
corresponding Fock space [44]. For this reason, protocols
that start with vacuum states and where the honest par-
ties apply two-mode squeezing (to prepare TMSS or to
amplify a signal as in FL QKD), beamsplitters and per-
form heterodyne measurements will be covariant with re-
spect to U(n) acting as a product of the form U⊗p⊗U⊗q.
Examples of such CV protocols include the one-way
no-switching protocol of Ref. [9] and the two-way proto-
col with Gaussian displacements of Ref. [14], whose op-
tical schemes are respectively covariant with respect to
UA ⊗UB , and UA1 ⊗UA2 ⊗UB1 ⊗UB2 (see Fig. 1). Our
framework also allows for signal amplification thanks to
two-mode squeezing as in FL QKD (see Fig. 2).
Security proof with the Gaussian de Finetti
reduction.— A QKD protocol typically consists of three
different stages: (i) state distribution, (ii) measurement
and parameter estimation, (iii) error reconciliation and
privacy amplification. State distribution can be modeled
in two distinct ways: either by describing how Alice and
Bob prepare the state and distribute it using some un-
trusted quantum channel (or possibly several channels),
or by assuming that the state is given to them by the
adversary. The goal of the second stage of the protocol
is to obtain a min-entropy resource, in the language of
Ref. [28]: the modes are measured with heterodyne de-
tection, yielding classical strings, X for Alice and Y for
Bob, one of which is then processed to give the raw key
Z = f(X), or Z = f(Y ), via some key map f [27, 34].
The size of the strings X,Y depends on the number of
modes held by the honest parties: X,Y ∈ Cn for one-way
CVQKD, while X = (X1, X2), Y = (Y1, Y2) ∈ Cn × Cn
for two-way CVQKD, and X,Y are even triplets of n-
dimensional vectors in the case of FL protocols (see
Fig. 2). Parameter estimation then consists in a test
that checks whether the correlations between X and Y
are sufficient to imply a lower bound on the smooth min-
entropy Hεmin(Z|E)ρZE , where ε is the smoothing param-
eter and E is the quantum register held by the adversary
[27]. If the test passes, the protocol continues, otherwise
it aborts. As usual, one can consider without loss of gen-
erality that the whole state ρABE before measurement
is pure. The final stage of the protocol transforms this
3min-entropy resource, Z, into a secret key using the stan-
dard techniques of QKD: error reconciliation and privacy
amplification.
Assuming as usual that error reconciliation and privacy
amplification are correctly implemented, it is sufficient
to establish the existence of a (smooth) min-entropy re-
source to prove the security of the protocol [28]. In other
words, we simply need to make sure that the probability
that the test passes and that the min-entropy is too low
is negligible, for arbitrary input states.
LetM : AB → XY be the (heterodyne) measurement
map and Gram(X,Y ) be the m×m Gram matrix (with
m = dA + dB) of the vectors X1, . . . , XdA , Y1, . . . , YdB
or their conjugate Xi or Y j (depending on whether the
corresponding mode is transformed according to U or
U through the U(n)-symmetry). The test T is then a
classical function that examines Gram(X,Y ) (which cor-
responds essentially to the empirical observation of the
covariance matrix) and passes if it belongs to some pre-
defined set of acceptable covariances matrices, and fails
otherwise, in which case the protocol aborts. We do not
describe the set of good covariance matrices explicitly
here, as this would require to take into account tedious
finite-size effects. A full treatment of the security proof
in the finite-size regime goes beyond the scope of this
work, but the interested reader is referred to Ref. [35]
for an example in the case of one-way CVQKD. The goal
of the security proof is simply to show that T ◦M real-
izes a min-entropy resource: the probability that the test
passes and that the string Z has low min-entropy with
respect to Eve’s register E should be upper bounded by
some small ε.
There are many subtleties involved with CVQKD, one
being how to perform the parameter estimation (i.e., the
test T ) in a composable fashion. A possibility introduced
in [35] is to postpone the parameter estimation until af-
ter error reconciliation, so that one of the parties obtains
both X and Y and be able to compute the Gram matrix
and perform the test T . This is fine since parameter es-
timation and error reconciliation are classical maps that
commute.
What is crucial here is that both M and T commute
with the action U of the unitary group. For T , this re-
sults from the choice of the set of acceptable Gram ma-
trices, which itself is a consequence of the invariance of
the optical setup of the protocol (see Figs 1 and 2). This
implies as proven in [6] and [12] that the security of the
map T ◦M (and therefore of the overall QKD protocol)
can be analyzed by considering only de Finetti states,
which in our case are SU(m,m) coherent states if Alice
and Bob hold in total m = dA + dB modes per round
of the protocol. As introduced in Ref. [13], SU(m,m)
generalized coherent states are i.i.d. Gaussian states of
the form |Λ〉⊗n where |Λ〉 is a 2m-mode Gaussian state
parametrized by an m × m matrix complex Λ = [Λi,j ]
with spectral norm ‖Λ‖ < 1 and defined as |Λ〉 =
det(1−ΛΛ†)1/2 exp (∑mi,j=1 Λi,ja†i b†j)|vacuum〉 where the
creation operators of Alice and Bob’s modes are denoted
a†1, . . . , a
†
m, b
†
1, . . . , b
†
m. For instance, SU(1, 1) coherent
states are simply TMSS. In particular, the methods de-
veloped in [12] show that ε-security against Gaussian col-
lective attacks then implies ε′-security against general at-
tacks, with ε′/ε = O(nm
2
). In other words, it is sufficient
to show that the protocol is secure when the overall initial
pure state ρABE is a mixture of such SU(m,m) coherent
states. For the protocols considered here, m is in gen-
eral a small constant (2 for the no-switching protocol,
4 for the two-way protocol and 6 for FL QKD), mean-
ing that the loss in the security parameter can easily be
compensated by reducing the final key length by a negli-
gible amount. As an indication that this proof technique
is rather tight, recall that the de Finetti reduction of [6]
applied to the BB84 protocol yields a ratio ε′/ε = O(n15)
between security against general and collective attacks.
The novelty here compared to [12, 35] is that we re-
strict our analysis to T ◦M instead of the whole QKD
protocol. While the latter doesn’t commute with the uni-
tary group (because of error reconciliation for instance)
and one had to symmetrize the state in order to enforce
the correct invariance, the min-entropy resource part of
the protocol commutes with the action of U(n) and the
work of Portman allows us to infer the security of the
QKD protocol [28]. For this reason, the proof holds with-
out any need for actively symmetrizing the state, even at
the classical level. This settles an open question from
Refs [12, 35].
About MDI CVQKD.— At first sight, MDI
CVQKD doesn’t quite fit our framework since it involves
a third node, controlled by Charlie, performing a Bell
measurement consisting of homodyning two modes. More
precisely, the idea is that both Alice and Bob prepare a
TMSS, keep one mode each and send their other mode
to Charlie who performs entanglement swapping, pub-
licly announcing the results of his Bell measurement, and
allowing Alice and Bob to conditionally displace their re-
maining mode in order to create some correlations [22].
In this scenario, one could a priori consider that there
are four optical modes: one for Alice, one for Bob and
two measured by Charlie, hinting that one should appeal
to a proof technique similar to that of two-way CVQKD.
This is for instance an approach followed in [36] where
it was realized that this scheme has the advantage of
not requiring much public communication for parame-
ter estimation. However, this description doesn’t seem
compatible with the Gaussian de Finetti reduction since
the homodyne detection performed by Charlie breaks the
invariance of the protocol under the group U(n). An al-
ternative approach is to view this scheme as a special
case of one-way CVQKD by treating Charlie’s communi-
cation as part of the state distribution: once Alice and
Bob’s displacements have been performed, the two hon-
est parties are left with a bipartite two-mode quantum
state. This is the same situation as after state distribu-
tion in the EB version of the no-switching protocol [9].
In this sense, while MDI CVQKD is implemented sim-
ilarly as a two-way CVQKD protocol, its security can
4be analyzed as a one-way CVQKD, with a Gaussian de
Finetti reduction involving SU(2, 2) coherent states. In
particular, the reduction from Ref. [12] together with the
security proof of Ref. [35] establish the security of MDI
CVQKD against general attacks (see also [37, 38]).
An example: two-way Gaussian CVQKD with
heterodyne detection.— In the PM version, Alice
sends coherent states with a Gaussian modulation to
Bob, who performs a random Gaussian displacement to
the mode he receives and sends it back through the quan-
tum channel. Alice measures the output mode with het-
erodyne detection, and computes a weighted sum of this
result and the value of her initial coherent state. This
serves as the raw key. The weights in the sum as well as
the variances of the Gaussian distribution should be op-
timized to yield the maximum key rate. Note that this
protocol differs a little bit from the one of Ref. [14] in
that here Bob always performs a displacement, that the
weights of the sum are optimized and that Bob also ex-
ploits the second output of his beamsplitter to guess the
raw key. The setup of the corresponding EB version is
depicted on Fig. 1.
If the quantum channels are covariant with respect to
U(n), as expected for instance in the case of a passive ad-
versary and a bosonic phase-insensitive channel, then the
covariance matrix of the state ρA1A2B1B2 is invariant un-
der UA1⊗ UA2⊗ UB1 ⊗ UB2 , as detailed in Appendix A.
For this protocol, the set of acceptable covariance ma-
trices will therefore satisfy the same symmetry. This
implies that the Gaussian de Finetti reduction can be
applied to provide a composable security proof against
general attacks. In particular, this means that Gaus-
sian attacks, described by SU(4, 4) generalized coherent
states, are asymptotically optimal and that the asymp-
totic key rate can be computed with standard techniques
[33]: see Appendix B for details.
FIG. 1: Optical scheme of the EB version of the two-way
protocol: ’Sq’ is a two-mode squeezer; ’BS’ is a beamsplitter
required to implement the random displacement by Bob.
About Floodlight (FL) QKD.—FL QKD offers the
perspective of much higher key rates than traditional
QKD at metropolitan range by exploiting multimode en-
coding and signal amplification techniques to compensate
for the extra losses present in two-way QKD compared to
one-way QKD. However, establishing the security of this
scheme has proven challenging. Here, we note that vari-
ants of FL QKD fit our framework, provided that the
encoding is done through a random Gaussian displace-
ment by Bob, instead of applying a random phase to the
signal. Indeed, such a (binary) phase-shift breaks the
U(n)-symmetry of the protocol. A description of such a
Gaussian protocol appears on Fig. 2. There are two ad-
ditional elements compared to two-way CVQKD: Alice
attenuates her signal before sending it through the quan-
tum channel with a beamsplitter, and Bob is allowed
to amplify his signal with a two-mode squeezer before
sending it back to Alice. In total, both Alice and Bob
hold three optical modes for each of the n instances, and
the protocol is invariant under the action of the unitary
group U(n) acting as UA1⊗UA2⊗UA3⊗UB1⊗UB2⊗UB3 .
In particular, this implies that one can use the Gaus-
sian de Finetti reduction to reduce the security proof to
considering Gaussian attacks, parametrized by SU(6, 6)
generalized coherent states.
FIG. 2: Optical scheme of the Gaussian FL protocol
Conclusion.— In this work, we considered a large
class of CVQKD protocols which are invariant with re-
spect to the unitary group U(n) and showed that it is
sufficient to establish their security against Gaussian col-
lective attacks. This extends the results of Ref. [12] to
two-way protocols which are known to display improved
tolerance to noise compared to the no-switching protocol,
and provides the first composable security proof for two-
way CVQKD protocols against general attacks. More-
over, by exploiting the modularity of the QKD protocols
as introduced by Portmann, we proved that active sym-
metrization of the data is not needed to apply the de
Finetti reduction and to obtain security.
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6In this appendix, we first study in detail in Section A why the two-way and the FloodLight CV QKD protocols
respect the symmetry of the unitary group U(n). Then for completeness, we provide in Section B the explicit
calculations of the asymptotic secret key rate of our version of the two-way protocol.
Appendix A: Symmetry of the two-way and floodlight protocols with respect to U(n).
1. Two-way protocol
In order to show that the first part of the protocol (which implements a min-entropy resource) is covariant with
respect to the action of U(n), we need to show that both the optical scheme (in Alice and Bob’s labs) and the
parameter estimation procedure satisfy this symmetry. We have not completely specified the parameter estimation
procedure so far, except to say that it consists in estimating the Gram matrix of the measurement outcomes of Alice
and Bob, and accepting if the estimate is within some predefined acceptance region, or aborting otherwise. The
protocol (and in particular, the acceptance region) is in general designed in order to perform well when the adversary
is passive: here, it means that the quantum channel is expected to be a covariant bosonic thermal channel which
is a good model for fiber-based quantum communication. Under the assumption that both quantum channels are
covariant, it is straightforward to verify graphically (as depicted on Fig. 3) that the quantum state held in registers
A1, A2, B1, B2 by Alice and Bob before they perform their heterodyne measurement is invariant under the unitary
transformation U⊗U⊗U⊗U . For this reason, it is natural to choose an accepting region for the parameter estimation
test that also satisfies this symmetry.
Now the parameter estimation procedure is therefore covariant with respect to the unitary group by construction,
and the optical part of the protocol is also covariant as can be checked by exploiting the commutation relations
[S⊗n,U ⊗ U ] = [B⊗n,U ⊗ U ] = [M,U ] = 0.
This means that the first part of the protocol, that implements the min-entropy resource, is indeed covariant with
respect to the action of the unitary group U(n), and that one can apply the de Finetti reduction in order to prove
the security of the protocol against general attacks.
7(a) Unitaries applied to vacuum (b) Covariance with the initial squeezers
(c) Covariance with the forward channel (d) Covariance with Bob’s beamsplitter
(e) Covariance with the backward channel (f) Commutation with Alice’s second squeezer
FIG. 3: Propagation of the unitaries through the circuit of the two-way protocol. ‘Sq’ and ‘BS’ stand respectively for two-mode
squeezer and beamsplitter. One starts by applying unitaries U or U¯ to the input of the protocol and propagates these operators
through the setup. Since the input of the setup is the vacuum and therefore invariant under the action of U or U¯ , we infer that
the protocol is invariant if Alice and Bob process their modes A1, A2, B1, B2 by U ⊗ U¯ ⊗ U ⊗ U¯ .
82. Floodlight protocol
(a) Unitaries applied to vacuum (b) Covariance with the initial squeezers
(c) Covariance with Alice’s beamsplitter (d) Covariance with the forward channel
(e) Covariance with Bob’s beamsplitter (f) Covariance with Bob’s second squeezer
(g) Covariance with the backward channel
FIG. 4: Propagation of the unitaries through the circuit of the FL protocol.‘Sq’ and ‘BS’ stand respectively for two-mode
squeezer and beamsplitter. One starts by applying unitaries U or U¯ to the input of the protocol and propagates these operators
through the setup. Since the input of the setup is the vacuum and therefore invariant under the action of U or U¯ , we infer that
the protocol is invariant if Alice and Bob process their modes A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3 by U ⊗ U¯ ⊗ U¯ ⊗ U ⊗ U¯ ⊗ U .
9The analysis is similar to the case of two-way CV QKD: one simply follows the propagation of unitaries through
the quantum circuit, as depicted on Fig. 4.
Appendix B: Secret key rate of the two-way protocol
We have seen in the main text how to analyze the security of some Gaussian CV QKD protocols. Such an
analysis doesn’t require any assumption about the untrusted quantum channels controlled by the adversary. In
order to assess the performance of QKD protocols, however, it is necessary to provide a (realistic) model of the
expected quantum channels. In the context of continuous-variable communication, a standard approach is to model
the quantum channels via thermal bosonic channels. Such channels are parametrized by two quantities corresponding
to loss and noise: τ ∈ [0, 1] is the transmittance of the channel and ξ ≥ 0 is the so-called excess noise. (An alternate
parametrization of the channel that is sometimes used in the literature is via transmittance and thermal noise, but
we will prefer the excess noise which is the quantity more directly related to the quality of the implementation.)
With these notations, preparing an initial TMSS with variance V ≥ 1 and covariance matrix
[
V 12
√
V 2−1σz√
V 2−1σz V 12
]
and sending the second mode through the channel of parameters (τ, ξ) yields a Gaussian state with covariance matrix[
V 12
√
τ
√
V 2−1σz√
τ
√
V 2−1σz (τ(V−1+ξ)+1)12
]
, where σz =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
.
In this section, we review how to estimate the (asymptotic) secret key rate of this protocol. Similar analyses can
be found in Refs [14, 17, 18, 40] for instance.
We use the notations depicted on Fig. 5. Alice and Bob each start with a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, of
respective variances VA and VB . Alice sends one mode (A
′
1) through the quantum channel and Bob mixes one of his
modes (B′1) together with the output of the quantum channel (C1) on a beamsplitter of transmittance T . Bob then
sends back one of the output modes back through the quantum channel. Alice finally performs a two-mode squeezing
operation with squeezing g on her two modes. All the mode are measured with heterodyne detection, and we choose
the outcome corresponding to mode A2 to be the raw key. The values of the three squeezing operations and of the
beamsplitter are optimized so as to maximize the secret key rate.
FIG. 5: Description of the EB version of the two-way protocol. Two pairs of two-mode squeezed vacuum states are initially
prepared by Alice and Bob in modes (A′1, A
′′
1 ) and (B1, B
′
1), respectively. Mode A
′
1 is sent through the quantum channel. The
output mode C1 is combined with B
′
1 in a beamsplitter: this effectively implements a Gaussian displacement of mode C1. One
output mode of the beamsplitter, C2, is then sent back through the quantum channel and finally combined with A
′′
1 with a
two-mode squeezer. One of the two output modes, A2 is then measured with heterodyne detection and the measurement result,
X2, serves as the raw key. In the Prepare and Measure version of the protocol, Alice and Bob would simply prepare A
′
1 and B
′
1
in a coherent state with a Gaussian modulation, Bob would apply the displacement operation (via the beamsplitter) and send
back the output mode C2 to Alice who would measure it with heterodyne detection. None of the three two-mode squeezers are
needed in the PM version as they can always be simulated classically.
Covariance matrices
For the purpose of assessing the performance of the protocol, it is useful to compute the key rate in realistic
conditions. Here, we choose to model the quantum channels by thermal channels with transmittance τ and excess
noise ξ.
Let us follow the notations of Fig. 5 and compute the various covariance matrices, the one of interest being
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ΓA1A2B1B2 . We also use the following conventions:
VA = v + 1, z =
√
v2 + 2v, VB = v
′ + 1, z′ =
√
v′2 + 2v′.
Moreover, all the matrices are block-matrices. We use boldface to indicate that a 2 × 2 matrix is proportional to
σz. Otherwise, the block is simply proportional to 12.
The initial covariance matrix is:
ΓA′′1A′1B1B′1 = 14 +
v zz v v′ z′
z′ v′
 ,
where we omit the zeroes in the matrices.
Mode A′1 goes through the quantum channel (τ, ξ), yielding:
ΓA′′1C1B1B′1 = 14 +

v
√
τz√
τz τ(v + ξ)
v′ z′
z′ v′
 .
The beamsplitter interaction gives
ΓA′′1C2B2B1 =
(
12 ⊕
[ √
T12
√
1− T12
−√1− T12
√
T12
]
⊕ 12
)
ΓA1C1B′1B1
(
12 ⊕
[ √
T12 −
√
1− T12√
1− T12
√
T12
]
⊕ 12
)
= 14 +

v
√
Tτz −√(1− T )τz
∗ Tτ(v + ξ) + (1− T )v′ −√T (1− T )(τ(v + ξ)− v′) √(1− T )z′
∗ ∗ (1− T )τ(v + ξ) + Tv′ √Tz′
∗ ∗ v′
 .
Since the matrices are symmetric, we simply write ∗ in the bottom left matrix to improve the readability.
Now mode C2 goes back through the quantum channel (τ, ξ). One obtains:
ΓA′′1C′2B2B1 = 14 +

v
√
Tτz −√(1− T )τz
∗ Tτ2(v + ξ) + (1− T )τv′ + τξ −√T (1− T )τ(τ(v + ξ)− v′) √(1− T )τz′
∗ ∗ (1− T )τ(v + ξ) + Tv′ √Tz′
∗ ∗ v′

= 14 +
v z1 z2∗ v1 z12 z′1∗ ∗ v2 z′2
∗ ∗ v′
 =
V z1 z2∗ V1 z12 z′1∗ ∗ V2 z′2
∗ ∗ V ′

with
v1 := Tτ
2(v + ξ) + (1− T )τv′ + τξ
v2 := (1− T )τ(v + ξ) + Tv′
z1 :=
√
Tτz
z2 := −
√
(1− T )τz
z12 := −
√
T (1− T )τ(τ(v + ξ)− v′)
z′1 :=
√
(1− T )τz′
z′2 :=
√
Tz′
Vi := 1 + vi
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Finally, Alice applies two-mode squeezing to her two modes, in order to form the raw key. This can be interpreted
as performing a weighted combination of her two modes. The value of the squeezing is optimized so as to maximize
the expected secret key.
ΓA1A2B2B1 =
([ √
g −√g − 1
−√g − 1 √g
]
⊕ 14
)
ΓA′′1C′2B′′2 B′′1
([ √
g −√g − 1
−√g − 1 √g
]
⊕ 14
)
with g ≥ 1.
This gives:
ΓA1A2B2B1 =
gV + (g − 1)V1 + 2
√
g(g − 1)z1 −
√
g(g − 1)(V + V1) + (2g− 1)z1 √gz2 −√g − 1z12 −√g − 1z′1
∗ (g − 1)V + gV1 − 2
√
g(g − 1)z1 −
√
g − 1z2 +√gz12 √gz′1
∗ ∗ V2 z′2
∗ ∗ V ′

The raw key is defined to be X2, the measurement outcome obtained when performing heterodyne detection on
mode A2.
In order to compute the secret key rate, it will also be useful to compute the covariance matrix ΓA1B2B1|X2 of the
state A1B2B1 conditioned on the measurement result X2. Given a general covariance matrix of the form Γ =
[
A C
CT B
]
,
the covariance matrix of the state conditioned on the measurement result of heterodyning the modes corresponding
to block A is [41]
ΓA1B2B1|X2 = B − CT (A+ 12)−1C,
with the following submatrices in our case where Alice measures the second mode with heterodyne detection:
A := ((g − 1)V + gV1 − 2
√
g(g − 1)z1−)12,
B :=
gV + (g − 1)V1 + 2√g(g − 1)z1 √gz2 −√g − 1z12 −√g − 1z′1∗ V2 z′2
∗ ∗ V ′
 ,
C :=
[−√g(g − 1)(V + V1) + (2g− 1)z1 −√g − 1z2 +√gz12 √gz′1] .
Secret key rate
With the above covariance matrices at hand, we are now ready to compute the asymptotic key rate of the two-way
protocol for a typical thermal bosonic channel of transmittance τ and excess noise ξ.
Exploiting the Gaussian de Finetti reduction as explained in the main text, the asymptotic key rate is given by the
Devetak-Winter formula [42]: It reads:
K =
1
2
(βI(X2; (Y1, Y2))− χ(X2;E)) , (B1)
where we choose X2, the measurement outcome of heterodyning mode A2, to be the raw key. Here, β ≤ 1 is the
so-called “reconciliation efficiency”. The factor 1/2 reflects the fact that we compute a key rate per channel use, and
that two channels are used in two-way CV QKD.
Let ΓX1X2Y1Y2 denote the covariance matrix of the measurement outcomes. It if given by:
ΓX1X2Y1Y2 =
1
2
(ΓA1A2B1B2 + 18).
A subtlety of the EB protocol is that the parties might need to rescale their classical data in order to perform
error reconciliation. This is for instance the case of the variable Y1: it is better for Bob to exploit the value of the
second mode, B′1, of his two-mode squeezer, which can be obtained by rescaling Y1 by
√
2(VB − 1)/(VB + 1). The
new covariance matrix is given by:
ΓX1X2Y ′1Y2 = diag
1, 1,√2(VB − 1)
VB + 1
, 1
ΓX1X2Y1Y2diag
1, 1,√2(VB − 1)
VB + 1
, 1
 ,
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where diag(a, . . . , z) is the diagonal matrix with diagonal coefficients a, . . . , z.
The mutual information I(X2; (Y1, Y
′
2)) is given by
I(X2; (Y1, Y2)) = log2
[
det ΓX2 det ΓY ′1Y2
det ΓX2Y ′1Y2
]
. (B2)
The Holevo information χ(X2;E) can be computed as follows:
χ(X2;E) = S(E)− S(E|X2) = S(A1A2B1B2)− S(A1B1B2|X2) (B3)
where we used the fact that Eve’s register E can be assumed without loss of generality to purify the systems A1A2B1B2.
Moreover, because we assume that Alice performs a heterodyne detection, which projects the state onto a pure coherent
state, we also have S(A1B1B2|X2) = S(E|X2).
Let us denote by ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4 the symplectic eigenvalues of ΓA1A2B1B2 and by ν˜1, ν˜2, ν˜3 the symplectic eigenvalues
of ΓA1B1B2|X2 , which is the covariance matrix of the postmeasurement state after Alice has obtained outcome X2.
Then, the Holevo information is given by
χ(X2;E) =
4∑
i=1
g(νi)−
3∑
i=1
g(ν˜i), (B4)
with the function g defined by
g(x) :=
x+ 1
2
log2
(
x+ 1
2
)
− x− 1
2
log2
(
x− 1
2
)
. (B5)
Recall that the symplectic eigenvalues of the matrix Γ correspond to the standard eigenvalues of |iΩΓ|, or equiva-
lently, to the modulus of the eigenvalues of iΩΓ, where the symplectic form Ω is given by Ω =
⊕d
i=1
[
0 1
−1 0
]
, and d
is the number of modes.
Finally, the key rate is obtained by optimizing over the choices of the variances VA, VB , transmittance T and
squeezing gain g.
We plot on Fig. 6 the asymptotic key rate of the two-way protocol and of the (one-way) no-switching protocol,
in the case of a noiseless channel (ξ = 0), assuming perfect reconciliation efficiency. The key rate of the one-way
protocol can be obtained similarly by imposing VA = 1, i.e., Alice sends the vacuum to Bob, fixing T = 0 so that
mode B2 contains the vacuum, and getting rid of the final squeezer in Alice’s lab (by choosing g = 1). We note that
the two-way protocol slightly outperforms the one-way protocol in the regime of ultralow loss (T close to 1).
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FIG. 6: Secret key rate of the two-way CV QKD protocol (full line) and of the one-way no-switching protocol (dashed line),
assuming a pure-loss channel (ξ = 0) and perfect reconciliation efficiency (β = 1).
We plot on Fig. 7 the key rate of the two protocols with a noisy channel (ξ = 0.1), and realistic reconciliation
efficiency, β = 0.95. The advantage of the two-way protocol is clear in this case.
FIG. 7: Secret key rate of the two-way CV QKD protocol (full line) and of the one-way no-switching protocol (dashed line),
assuming a noisy channel (ξ = 0.1) and imperfect reconciliation efficiency (β = 0.95).
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We plot on Fig. 8 the tolerable excess noise of the two-way and one-way no-switching protocol against the channel
transmittance τ , that is the value of ξ for which the key rate becomes 0. The main advantage of the two-way protocol
is its much larger tolerance to noise.
FIG. 8: Maximum tolerable excess noise ξ for the two-way CV QKD protocol (full line) and the one-way no-switching protocol
(dashed line), assuming perfect reconciliation efficiency (β = 1).
